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Abstract
This paper uses consumer search data to explain search frictions in online
markets, within the context of an equilibrium search model. I use a novel
dataset of consumer online browsing and purchasing behavior, which tracks all
consumer search prior to each transaction. Using observed search intensities
from the online book industry, I estimate search cost distributions that allow for
asymmetric consumer sampling. Research on consumer search often assumes a
symmetric sampling rule for analytical convenience despite its lack of realism.
Search behavior in the online book industry is quite limited: in only 25 percent
of the transactions did consumers visit more than one bookstores website. The
industry is characterized by a strong consumer preference for certain retailers.
Accounting for unequal consumer sampling halves the search cost estimates
from $1.8 to $0.9 per search in the online book industry. Analysis of time spent
online suggests substitution between the time consumers spend searching and
the relative opportunity cost of their time. Retired people, those with lower
education levels, and minorities (with the exception of Hispanics) spent signif-
icantly more time searching for a book online. There is a negative relationship
between income levels and time spent searching.
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1 Introduction
This paper uses consumer search data to explain search frictions in online markets,
within the context of an equilibrium search model. I use a novel dataset of consumer
online browsing and purchasing behavior. This dataset is unique in that it allows
tracking of all consumer search prior to each transaction. Using observed search
intensities, I estimate search cost distributions that allow for asymmetric sampling
by consumers. These estimates can help explain price dispersion in online markets.
Search data is also useful in identifying sources of search cost heterogeneity, and the
resulting substitution patterns between time spent searching and online expenditures.
The expansion of e-commerce has motivated a large body of research that an-
alyzes search mainly through measures of price dispersion in online markets. This
research relies predominantly upon prices from price comparison websites, and there
is a general notion in these studies that substantial price dispersion persists in on-
line markets.1 However, estimates of price dispersion appear to be highly sensitive
to implied market structure. In the absence of quantity data, most studies weight
prices from di¤erent rms equally and assume that sales occur at each observed price.
These are questionable assumptions in most online markets given the presence of large
dominant rms and retailers that sell very small quantities. Using prices from the
eight bookstores with the largest number of online visitors, Brynjolfsson and Smith
(2000) estimate signicantly lower price dispersion when controlling for a rms mar-
ket share. In addition, the high concentration of some online markets suggests that
the distribution of price o¤erings from comparison sites is likely to di¤er greatly from
equilibrium price distribution. This could have a signicant e¤ect on measured price
dispersion and therefore on search cost estimates.
In the model, I relax the assumption that consumers randomly sample from the
price distribution. Research on consumer search often assumes a symmetric sampling
rule for analytical convenience. However, this is not a realistic assumption: search
patterns in this dataset indicate a strong consumer preference for certain retailers.
For example, in only 25 percent of transactions do consumers visit more than one
bookstore. Amazon was the rst bookstore visited by a consumer in 65 percent of the
transactions. In about 17 percent of transactions, consumers visited another book-
store before completing their transaction at Amazon. In contrast, about 39 percent
of Barnes and Nobles customers visited another bookstore, mainly Amazon. In fact
1See e.g. Clay et al. (2001, 2002), Baye et al. (2004), Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000), and Ellison
and Ellison (2004). Baye and Morgan (2005) provide a good summary of this research.
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most of the online bookstores seem to be ignored by consumers in their search. I
found that only 15 online bookstores from the dataset had book sales, with Amazon
and Barnes and Noble capturing 84 percent of the market. Most of the online book-
stores had no visits by consumers in the dataset: of the more than 230 bookstores,
15 bookstores in the sample capture 98 percent of all consumer visits. These search
patterns in the online book industry further support the assumption that consumers
have prior beliefs about the market distribution of prices.
These consumer search patterns indicate asymmetry within the online book mar-
ket, which must be accounted for in analyzing search frictions. Empirical price dis-
tributions that incorporate these asymmetries exhibit smaller gains from search, thus
implying lower search costs. Accounting for unequal consumer sampling halves the
search cost estimates from $1.8 to $0.9 per search in the online book industry.
Analysis of time spent online suggests substitution between the time consumers
spend searching and the relative opportunity cost of their time. Retired people, those
with lower education levels, and minorities (with the exception of Hispanics) spent
signicantly more time searching for a book online. There is a negative relation-
ship between income levels and time spent searching. As indicated by the smaller
number of bookstores they visit, individuals with income greater than $100,000 have
signicantly higher search cost.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the basic framework
of a nonsequential search model. Section 3 discusses the relevant literature on the
online book industry. Section 4 describes the data and discusses consumer search
patterns. Section 5 compares estimates of search cost models under symmetric and
asymmetric search, and analyzes the sources of search cost heterogeneity. Section 6
presents concluding remarks.
2 Model
In this section, I present a search model based on Burdett and Judds (1983) frame-
work, generalized by Hong and Shum (2006), but with two important deviations.2
First, I assume that consumers are knowledgeable about the markets equilibrium
price distribution, but do not know which rm charges each price. Stahl (1996)
exemplies the main di¤erence between this approach and the Nash equilibrium ap-
proach. According to Stahl, in the case of N rms, whose symmetric mixed strategy
2See Moraga-Gonzalez and Wildenbeest (2007) for an application of Hong and Shums (2006)
model in an oligopolistic setting.
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is to draw a price from a equilibrium price distribution, F (p), these N draws gener-
ate a discrete distribution of actual prices, M (p), or market distribution. The main
distinction between these two approaches is the information available to consumers.
Under the Nash paradigm, consumers have no information regarding actual prices and
their search process is optimal according to rmsmixed strategies, thus consumers
randomly sample prices from F (p). In contrast with this approach, I assume that
consumers have some information about the market distribution M (p).3
This assumption more accurately reects markets where consumers have a great
deal of information. For example, in the case of a nite number of multiproduct rms,
consumers learn about the relative price distribution through repeated transactions
with the rms. This is particularly important in cases where a rms relative prices for
a range of products are stable over time. These are features of some online markets,
in particular the book industry analyzed here.
Second, I relax the assumption that consumers randomly sample from the distri-
bution of prices. Observed search patterns in the data indicate a strong consumer
preference for certain retailers, derived from brand, trust, or overall consumer aware-
ness. This pattern further supports the assumption that consumers have prior beliefs
about the market distribution of prices. Asymmetric search determines market shares.
One advantage of search data and transaction prices is that we can approximate the
equilibrium price distribution in the presence of rm heterogeneity.
I derive a nonsequential search model for two main reasons. First, as shown
by Morgan and Manning (1985) there is not a clear advantage to sequential search
over nonsequential search. In fact, their analysis shows that an optimal search rule
combines the elements of nonsequential search with the exibility of sequential search.
In general, nonsequential search is preferred when there are xed costs for search. This
might be the case when online consumers budget time for their Internet shopping
and have to stop when time runs out (e.g. consumer visits to online bookstores last
11 minutes on average). Second, a nonsequential model makes the best use of the
available data. While I observe consumer search behavior prior to a transaction,
prices are observed only when consumers complete a transaction. In addition, a
nonsequential model allows the use of consumer search data to explore the sources of
search cost heterogeneity using an ordered response model. A nonsequential search
rule is reasonable where there are consumers who are informed about the past pricing
3A similar assumption can be found at Salop and Stiglitz (1977) and Rob (1985). The drawback
of this approach is that it gives consumers a discrete distribution of actual prices, limiting the use
of rmsmixed strategies.
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strategies of a small number of rms.
2.1 Nonsequential Search
Consumers inelastically demand one unit of a homogenous good. Under a nonsequen-
tial search rule, consumers decide the number of price quotations, n, to sample prior
to observing prices. The rst price quote is obtained for free and consumers incur
a cost c for each price quotation thereafter.4 Consumers optimally decide n, which
minimizes the total expected cost of search
n = argmin
n>1
c (n  1) + Epn(1) (1)
where Epn(1) is the expected minimum price for a sample of size n. Let the equilibrium
price distribution of the market, described by a probability mass function, be given
by
fp (p) = j for p = pj; j = 1; :::; N
where j > 0 for j = 1; ::; N and
PN
j=1 j = 1. Let pricesfpigni=1 be an i.i.d. random
sample rearranged in ascending order of magnitude, p1  p2  :::  pn. The expected
minimum price from a sample of size n is given by
Epn(1) = E [min fp1; :::; png ;n] =
nX
j=1
pjf
n
p(1)
(pj) (2)
where fnp(1) (p) denotes the p.m.f. of the minimum order statistic when consumers sam-
ple n prices without replacement. In Appendix A, I describe in detail the methodology
to compute fnp(1) (pj) from consumer search data.
The optimal sample size, n, is a decreasing function of c and has a unique solution
for a positive integer value of n. Denote the expected savings from increasing the
sample size by one as
n = Ep
n
(1)   Epn+1(1) : (3)
Given that i  0 for i = 1; ::; N; and the sequence of expected savings figNi=1 is
nonincreasing, the optimal sample size, n, satises
n < ci  n 1: (4)
4This is a common assumption in the literature (e.g. Stahl, 1989). See Janseen and Moraga-
Gonzalez (2004) for a oligopolistic model that analyzes the implications of deviations from this
assumption.
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Notice we can use reinterpret n as the largest search cost of a consumer who is
indi¤erent between searching n and n   1 rms.5 Hence, n can be used as cuto¤
values that generate partitions of search cost distribution G (c). The proportion of
consumers who sample n = 1; :::; N prices is given by
q1  1 G (1) (5)
qn  G (n 1) G (n) n = 2; :::; N   1
qN  G (N 1) :
In order to recover the parameters q1; ::; qN using solely price data, Hong and Shum
(2006) impose rms pricing equilibrium conditions, and estimate the model with
maximum empirical likelihood. This approach imposes conditions on the empirical
price distribution that do not necessarily provide a minimum variance estimator (see
Moraga-Gonzalez and Wildenbeest, 2007).
Using data on consumer search patterns and transaction prices greatly simplies
the estimation of search cost distribution. From consumer search, I calculate q1; ::; qN
directly as the proportion of consumers that search n = 1; :::; N without imposing
rmsequilibrium conditions. From these values, using equation (5) I recover the
search cost distribution G (c) evaluated at cuto¤ points i; for i = 1; ::; N   1. I
estimate i from the empirical distribution of transaction prices fp (p) = j for
p = pj; j = 1; :::; N using data on consumer search to estimate the weights j: I
compare the resulting search cost distributions to those that result from a random
sampling rule, fp (p) =  = 1=N for every p:
2.2 Consumer Search Cost Heterogeneity
In this section, I use consumer search data to explore the sources of search cost
heterogeneity. The nonsequential search model is suitable to t an ordered response
model, given that I observe the number of rms a consumer samples before a purchase,
5In the case of a continuous equilibrium price distribution F (p) with support

p; p

, the minimum
price is mn =
R p
p
pn [1  F (p)]n 1 dF (p). It is straightforward to show that it can be rewritten as
mn = p +
R p
p
[1  F (p)]n dp which is a monotone decreasing sequence of n; bounded below by p.
The expected gain for searching one more rm is
n =
Z p
p
[1  F (p)]n 1 F (p) dp
which is in turn a nonincreasing and convex function of n = 1; :::; N . See the work of Burdett and
Judd (1983), Hong and Shum (2006) and MacMinn (1980) for a derivation of these models.
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but do not directly observe search cost for each consumer. Dene Yi as the number
of rms that consumer i samples, which takes values n = 1; :::; N . Consumer search
costs are
ci = xi + "i: (6)
where xi is a vector of explanatory variables,  is a vector of parameters, and " is an
i.i.d. error with distribution H. Search costs are not directly observed in the data,
but I observe the number of rms consumers sampled according to n+1 < ci  n.
For N = 4 we have
Yi =
8>>>><>>>>:
1 if ci > 1
2 if 2 < ci  1
3 if 3 < ci  2
4 if ci  3
(7)
The probabilities of a these outcomes are given by
Pr (Yi = 1) = Pr (ci > 1) = Pr (xi + "i > 1) (8)
= 1 H (1   xi)
Pr (Yi = 2) = Pr (2 < ci  1) = Pr (2 < xi + "i < 1)
= H (1   xi) H (2   xi)
Pr (Yi = 3) = H (2   xi) H (3   xi)
Pr (Yi = 4) = H (3   xi)
The likelihood function is given by
lnL =
MX
i=1
NX
n=1
1 fYi = ng ln [H (n 1   xi) H (n   xi)] (9)
where 1 fYi = ng is an indicator function with 1 fYi = ng = 1 if Yi = n and 1 fYi = ng =
0 otherwise.
Ordered response models require the distribution H to be fully specied. In
the case "i  N (0; 1) this is the standard ordered probit setup. However, if "i is
not normally distributed, maximum likelihood estimates are inconsistent. Klein and
Spady (1993) provide a semiparametric methodology to approximate the distribution
for binary response models. Klein and Sherman (2002) extend the methodology to
ordered response models. Gallant and Nychka (1987) provide a semi-nonparametric
approximation of the distribution using an Hermite form, which is the product of a
squared polynomial and a normal density, but could be used with any distribution
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with a moment generating function (see Stewart, 2005 for an application). Both of
these approaches approximate the distribution up to a location and a scale.
3 Background and Literature Review
The book industry has been the focus of studies of online markets given the matu-
rity and predominance of the industry.6 Since Amazons launch in 1995, the online
industry has grown to represent 17 percent of the total sales of the $24.2 billion book
industry.7 With the exception of travel services, the book industry has the highest
penetration among Internet users. More than 30 percent of Internet users that re-
sponded the Forrester Technographics Survey of 2003 declared to have bought a book
online. This is a highly concentrated industry, with the two dominant rms capturing
83 percent of the market: Amazon (66 percent of book sales) and Barnes and Noble
(17 percent).8
The expansion of e-commerce has motivated a large body of research that analyses
search frictions mainly through measures of price dispersion in online markets. Using
predominantly prices from price comparison websites, there is a general notion in
these studies that substantial price dispersion persists in a large number of online
markets.9 Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) report price dispersion of 33 percent for 20
books sold at the eight online bookstores with the largest number of visitors. Clay et
al. (2001), using prices for 32 online bookstores, estimate that the price dispersion
for 399 books is between 32 and 65 percent. These studies show that online price
dispersion is higher than dispersion among traditional brick and mortar retailers (e.g.
Clay et al. 2001, 2002; Scholten and Smith, 2002; Pan et al. 2003).
These estimates of price dispersion appear to be highly sensitive to the implied
market structure. The evidence suggests that price dispersion found in the online
book industry is between large branded retailers and unbranded retailers. Clay et al.
(2001) nd that Amazon, Barnes and Noble, and Borders had the lowest standard
deviation of price, in contrast to a large dispersion found for fringe retailers. Bryn-
jolfsson and Smiths (2000) estimates of price dispersion are signicantly lower when
controlling for a rms market share, as measured by its websites popularity. The
main cause of these results is the high concentration of the industry and the similar
6See e.g. Clay et al. (2001) for a review of the industry.
7In 2006 Amazons sales of media (books, music, and DVDs) for North America totaled $3.6
billion, and Barnes and Noble reported sales of $433 million for its online site.
8Books sales in dollars for 2004 from the ComScore data sample.
9See Pan et al. (2004) for an excellent review of the research that studies online price dispersion.
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pricing strategies of large bookstores. Brynjolfsson and Smiths results indicate that
the prices for Barnes and Noble and Borders average -$0.19 and $0.09 di¤erence, re-
spectively, from Amazons price. Clay et al. (2001) calculate for a sample of 399 books
that 77 percent of Barnes and Nobles and 75 percent of Bordersprices are within
1 percent of di¤erence when compared to Amazons prices.10 This evidence suggests
that controlling for market share would lead to lower estimates of price dispersion.
Limitations to the use of price data could account for some of the unexplained
puzzles in the literature.11 For example Clay et al. (2001), using prices from online
comparison websites, show that small online bookstores have varied price strategies.
Most of these stores set prices slightly below Amazons prices, about $0.10 below
Amazons price. In some cases, small bookstores set prices above Amazons prices.
Clay et al. nd an Amazon price premium of between 10 and 25 percent.12 These
results have the same limitations as price dispersion estimates in the absence of quan-
tity data, since most of the price di¤erence is between Amazon and smaller retailers.
Chevalier and Goolsbee (2003) exemplify this limitation using prices and sales rank
data from Amazon and Barnes and Noble. They nd that prices weighted by sales
di¤er signicantly from prices estimated with sales weighted equally. Although indica-
tive of rm heterogeneity in terms of brand, service quality, or consumer awareness,
there is no conclusive evidence that higher-quality rms command higher prices (see
e.g. Baylis and Perlo¤, 2002; Pan et al., 2003).
Structural estimates that use only price data could lead to biased estimates of
search cost. Hong and Shum (2006) show that price data can also be used to estimate
search cost distributions consistent with theoretical models by using information on
supply and demand equilibrium conditions. However, this assumes that consumers
randomly sample prices from an innite number of rms. This assumption increases
the benet of search and could lead to higher search cost estimates.
The data on consumer search presented in the next section help to explain some
of the patterns found in online markets. In particular, search data is crucial to
understanding search costs in the online book industry. Search patterns indicate
that consumers visit only a small number of online bookstores. Consumers might
have never observed the full set of prices posted in online comparison websites. As
10For the market of consumer electronics, Baye et al. (2004) report that the levels of price
dispersion are sensitive to variations in the number of rms that post price quotes in price comparison
sites.
11Additionally users of price comparison sites may not represent the typical Internet user. Com-
Score Media Matrix found that only 4 percent of Internet users visited these sites in 2000.
12Average savings from buying from the lowest price among 32 bookstores listed in two major
price comparison websites instead of Amazon, measured as a percentage of Amazons price.
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a result, the distribution of price o¤erings is likely to di¤er greatly from transaction
prices.
4 Data
The dataset was constructed from the ComScore Web-Behavior Panel which includes
detailed online browsing and transaction data from 100,000 Internet users in 2002
and 52,028 users in 2004 chosen at random from a universe of 1.5 million global users.
ComScore is a leading provider of information on consumers online behavior and
supplies Fortune 500 companies and large news organizations with market research
on e-commerce sales trends, website tra¢ c, and online advertising campaigns. Each
users online activity is channeled through ComScore proxy servers that record all
Internet tra¢ c, including information on visits to a website or domain (browsing),
as well as secure online transactions. The data include date, time, and duration of
visit, as well as price, quantity, and description of each product purchased during the
session.
The dataset contains userstransactions for products and services from June 2002
to December 2002 and for the full year of 2004. Approximately 38 percent of the users
realized a product transaction in 2002 (48 percent of users in 2004), and 7 percent
of users bought at least one book online in 2002 (10 percent in 2004). The book
transactions exclude observations from websites that could not be identied as online
bookstores, such as unidentied domains and auction sites (Appendix B describes the
sample construction in detail). This results in transactions from 15 online bookstores
with 17,956 observations in 2002 and 17,631 observations in 2004. Each observation
represents a single book purchased during one transaction; if multiple copies of the
book are purchased, it is recorded as one observation.
The browsing activity of all users consists of 112,361 visits to the websites of online
bookstores in 2002 and 214,713 visits in 2004.13 In order to identify a users visit to
a website as search behavior related to a particular transaction, I link the browsing
history up to 7 days before that transaction, which I label the cuto¤ period. There is
no evidence to guide the denition of a search time span in relation to a transaction.
One week is long enough to capture all search behavior related to a transaction; any
longer intervals are likely to also capture unrelated website visits. A search history
could be less than 7 days if another transaction has occurred within the cuto¤ period
13This large increase was the result of a more than twofold increase in the number of visits to
Amazon, which is the largest online bookstore and had 80 percent of website visits in 2004.
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(in these cases, the average time span is 2.9 days between transactions). Limiting
browsing to search occurring 7 days prior to a purchase reduces the sample to 18,349
observations in 2002 and 25,513 in 2004. Although some user search may not be
linked to the next transaction, but to a subsequent one, there is no clear way to link
this intervening search to a later transaction. For example, if a user searches prices
for book A but buys book B rst, the search for book A is linked to book B. In the
case where multiple books are acquired in the same transaction, browsing is linked
to all books purchased.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the consumer browsing and transaction
data. Website visits that are not linked to any transaction are signicantly shorter
than visits occurring within 7 days of a transaction, even when lengthy transaction
visits are not included. Although the average duration of website visits has diminished
from 2002 to 2004, the total duration of search has increased in this period. The
dominance of Amazon and Barnes and Noble in the market might explain the low
levels of consumer search: users on average searched 1.2 bookstores in 2002 and 1.3 in
2004. The average number of books bought (2.2 to 2.4 books) and average expenditure
per transaction can be explained by consumers taking advantage of some bookstores
o¤ers for free shipping for purchases above $25.
4.1 Consumer Search Patterns
Search behavior provides insight into the nature of consumer awareness, brand recog-
nition, and preference for some rms. Amazon and Barnes and Noble capture 83
percent of book transactions and thus it is expected that most consumer search is
directed at those stores. This work uncovers two important consumer search patterns
in the online book industry. First, search is limited. In only 25 percent of transactions
did consumers search more than one bookstore. The fraction of consumers that price
shop is small: 27 percent of consumers searched more than one rm in any of their
transactions in 2002, and 33 percent of consumers in 2004. Second, consumers do not
visit the majority of bookstores available, they show a strong retailer preference in
their search patterns, visiting 1.29 online bookstores on average.
In order to analyze consumer search of online bookstores, I grouped small book-
stores into two categories to create four rms: Amazon (63 percent of transactions),
Barnes and Noble (21 percent), Book clubs (12 percent), and Other bookstores (4
percent). Book clubs include the following sites (.com): Christianbook, Double-
daybookclub, Eharlequin, Literaryguild, and Mysteryguild. Other bookstores include
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(.com): 1bookstreet, Allbooks4less, Alldirect, Booksamillion, Ecampus, Powells, Var-
sitybooks, and Walmart. In order to determine whether restricting consumer search
to the 4 rms adequately captures consumer behavior in this market, I estimate the
amount of consumer browsing directed at all 234 online bookstores listed on the Yahoo
directory. As expected, consumer browsing of the four rms captures most consumer
search; only about 1.6 percent of all consumer visits were directed to excluded book-
stores.
One important consideration is Amazon Marketplace, rst launched in Novem-
ber 2000, which allows third-party sellers to o¤er items through Amazons website.
When available, third-party o¤erings appear below Amazons price on a books web-
page. Since purchases of third-party books are processed through Amazons payment
system, these transactions are indistinguishable from Amazons direct transactions.
According to Amazons nancial reports for the third quarter of 2002, third-party
seller transactions represented 23 percent of North American sales units. However,
this gure includes new, used, and refurbished items in several product categories in
addition to books.
Table 2 displays consumer visits to any of the four rms for each book transaction.
The rst part of the table shows the proportion of times a particular bookstore was
visited rst by a consumer within the search history of each transaction. In the
rst column, the proportions for all transactions correspond closely the rms market
shares: Amazon was visited rst in 65 percent of the sample; Barnes and Noble, 17
percent; Book clubs, 11 percent; and Other bookstores, 7 percent. The rest of the
columns are conditioned on the bookstore where the consumer purchased the book.
This allows me to analyze consumer retailer preferences. For shoppers who bought
a book from Amazon, 91 percent visited Amazon rst, compared with 68 percent of
Barnes and Noble buyers who visited Barnes and Noble rst. A signicant share of
consumers of Barnes and Noble, Book clubs and Other bookstores visit Amazon rst
in their search proccess (in 19 to 29 percent of transactions of these bookstores).
The second part of Table 2 shows consumer visits to bookstores at any point
in the search process. Amazon was visited in 74 percent book transactions, and in
only 17 percent of transactions did Amazon buyers browse any other bookstore. In
contrast, Barnes and Noble buyers searched other bookstores (mainly Amazon) in
39 percent of cases; Book club shoppers, 31 percent of cases; and Other bookstore
shoppers, 46 percent of cases. The limited search process is reected in the number of
stores that consumers search for each transaction. On average Amazon buyers search
1.2 bookstores, compared to Barnes and Noble, 1.5; Book clubs, 1.4; and Other
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bookstores, 1.6. These patterns show the asymmetric nature of the search process in
this industry.
4.2 Patterns of the Search Stopping Decision
I use observed patterns of consumer search to shed light on di¤erences in features of
common search rules found in the literature. In particular, I examine the importance
of recall, which is consumersability to buy an item at a previously observed price. In
a sequential search model with perfect recall, a consumer must decide after observing
a price to stop the search and buy at that price or continue the search. Under perfect
recall it is optimal to continue searching if the lowest observed price is higher than
a reservation price and stop if the lowest price is less than the reservation price. As
consumers do not want to incur costly search, they stop at the rst price at or below
the reservation price. As a consequence, if there are an innite number of rms,
consumers will always buy from the last visited rm since it is the rst price below
the reservation price, and they will never recall a previously observed price (see e.g.
Stahl, 1996). In the case of a nite number of stores, the only reason a consumer will
recall is if they visit all stores without observing a price below the reservation price.
In contrast, in a nonsequential search rule, consumers choose the minimum price after
observing all the prices in their optimal sample. One important note is that in cases
where consumers visit only one bookstore, we cannot distinguish between these two
search rules.
Table 3 presents a more detailed picture of the search process; in particular con-
sumersdecision to halt search either by buying from the last rm or by recalling a
previously searched rm. Every consumer visits at least one rm, which is the rm
where they complete their transaction. The top panel of the table shows the propor-
tion of transaction sessions where consumers visited only one store for a variety of
lengths of search period. All search behavior is linked to the next transaction, and
since there is no research to identify a correct search span, I have limited the lengths
to 7, 5, 3 days and 1 days prior to each book purchase, or to the same day of the
transaction.14
The table reiterates the previous ndings,that consumer search in this industry is
very limited. The rst column shows that in 76 percent of all transactions consumers
visited one bookstore when we examine search performed 7 days prior to a transaction.
The proportion of people that search one store increases as we shorten the length of
14Note that the table refers to transaction sessions, in which consumers can purchase more than
one book. In data from 2002 and 2004, consumers bought on average 2.29 books per transaction.
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the search period. When we consider search on the transaction day, in 90 percent
of cases consumers visited only one store. This is an expected result. For example,
consider a consumer who visits rm X one week prior to purchasing a book at rm
Y. If I establish a search period of 7 days, the visit to rm X will be counted as
search for that transaction, but it will not be included if the time span is 6 days or
fewer. As a result, the proportion of sessions where consumers visit only one rm will
be larger as we consider shorter search periods and omit visits to other rms. The
breakdown of transactions by rm shows the same pattern presented in the previous
section: Amazons buyers are less likely to visit other stores.
The bottom panel of the table shows decisions to stop search behavior in cases
where two or more bookstores were visited. In these cases, consumers ended their
search in one of two ways, by purchasing a book from the last rm they visited or
by purchasing a book from a previously visited rm. Given that the proportion of
cases where consumers visit two or more bookstores declines as the search period is
shortened, I show the proportions for these two cases in relative terms. For example,
for a search span of 7 days, in 76 percent of cases one rm was visited. The remaining
24 percent of cases correspond to visits to two or more bookstores. In 65 percent
of the latter group of cases (or 16 percent overall) consumers buy from the last rm
visited, and in 35 percent of the cases (8 percent overall) consumers recall a previously
searched rm.
This table shows consumers exercising their recall option in 35 to 40 percent of
cases, and it also shows important di¤erences in search patterns across rms. Amazon
consumers who visit other bookstores recall Amazons price 50 to 54 percent of the
time. In contrast, Barnes and Nobles consumers recall its price after visiting other
bookstores in 20 to 26 percent of cases. This pattern indicates that consumers start
their searches at Amazon. Hence, the majority of consumers who buy a book from
Amazon after visiting other bookstores e¤ectively recall Amazons price (50 to 54
percent). This contrasts with search of Amazons competition: consumers who search
more than one bookstore are likely to have visited Amazon before completing the
transaction at a competing bookstore. This behavior explains lower recall proportions
at those rms (for example, 20 to 26 percent of consumers return to purchase from
Barnes and Noble).
This table provides evidence of an underlying search asymmetry, and further ex-
emplies the importance of recall in search models. In a sequential model with perfect
recall and an innite number of rms, consumers always buy from the last rm and
hence never recall prices. Only in the case where there is a nite number of stores and
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consumers visit all stores would consumers recall a previously observed price. There
is no indication in this dataset that consumers are searching exhaustively in fact
they are rarely searching more than one rm. Thus a sequential search setting does
not account for the large proportion of recall behavior among those who search more
than one rm. Studies of search process in a sequential setting have found similar
results. This systematic recall supports the nonsequential search process presented
here. However, there are other models that might explain this, such as directed
search.15
4.3 Demographic Characteristics
In addition to browsing and transaction information, the dataset includes a rich set
of user demographic characteristics that I use to analyze the components of search
costs. In this section, I describe the demographic characteristics of the sample and,
using other datasets for comparison, I show that the sample is an appropriate repre-
sentation of Internet users. I use the Internet and Computer User Supplement of the
Current Population Survey (CPS) and the Forrester Technographics Survey (FTS).
User characteristics include household income and size, age of the eldest member,
education level and racial background of the head of the household, and an indicator
if children are present in the household. In addition, there is an indicator for high-
speed Internet connection (broadband), region of residence, and zip code information
for 2004.16 Given that the three sources of data have di¤erent denitions for some
variables, I present the exact methodology in Appendix B.
Table 4 presents demographic characteristics of users from ComScore, the CPS
of October 2003, and FTS 2003. I condition the three datasets to those users who
made any online transaction. Household composition is similar across samples with
an average of about 3 people per household, and 36 to 46 percent of households
having a child present. Those who purchased at least one book online (rst column)
are slightly older, with greater income and more education than those who had any
online transaction (second and third columns).
Compared with the CPS data, ComScore Internet users are older, with higher in-
come, but with a lower proportion of users having college and graduate degrees. The
15Zwick, Rapoport, and King Chun Lo (2001) nd large rates of recall, which violates optimal
policy, among participants of an experiment who are able to rank prices and are presented with
alternatives in a sequential order.
16The online activity recorded cannot be linked to a specic individual in the household. In cases
where multiple computers are tracked within a household, each computer is considered a di¤erent
user.
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discrepancy in education level is due to the large proportion of college students (those
with Some college but no degree) in the ComScore sample. The racial composition
is similar across samples online users are predominantly white. But compared with
CPS, ComScore oversamples Hispanics and Forrester oversamples whites. The geo-
graphic distribution of users is similar to CPS population estimates at the regional
and state levels (see Table 9 for state comparison of the samples).
As shown in the Table 4, the demographic characteristics of the users in the sample
are representative of online buyers in the United States. In fact, the most-purchased
books in the sample reect purchase patterns of the U.S. population as captured in
the New York Times Best Seller list. In the next section, I link the demographic
characteristics of users in the sample with search behavior.
5 Results
In this section, I present estimates of search cost distribution implied by the non-
sequential search model outlined in section 2. The model is estimated using informa-
tion on consumer search and empirical price distribution. The search cost distribu-
tion is characterized by cuto¤ points, n, and the quantiles of the distribution qn for
n = 1; : : : ; N .
To estimate the model I use search data and transaction prices for a selected
number of best sellers. Using the books with the largest number of transactions in
the sample has two important advantages. First, observed consumer browsing reects
price search rather than visits to conrm availability of the book, since bookstores
keep inventories of best-selling books. Second, using more observations for each book
reduces the time di¤erence of transactions, which is the potential bias of using implied
prices.
Table 5 displays descriptive statistics for 12 best-selling books in the sample.
These books reect consumer patterns in the United States, as indicated by the fact
that all but two were number one on the New York Times Best Seller list. For
each book, I observe prices for a maximum of 3 bookstores. The mean prices are
similar across books, except for Key of Valor, with an overall mean price of $15. The
proportion of consumers that searched n = 1; 2; or 3 bookstores is displayed in the
last three columns of the table. The majority of consumers do not search (i.e. they
only visit one store), ranging from 52 to 86 percent of consumers (72 percent overall).
In about 94 percent of transactions, consumers visit one or two bookstores.
Table 6 reports estimates of the empirical search cost distribution. The cuto¤s of
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the distribution, n, are estimated from the empirical price distribution in two ways.
First, assuming equal sampling probabilities, I calculate the expected minimum price
for each sample size by randomly sampling n prices from the empirical distribution
and averaging over 100,000 iterations (Appendix A provides a detailed explanation).
Since I only observe search at three rms, I can only identify the cuto¤s 1 and
2. Recall from section 2 that the we can recover the quantiles of the distribution,
G(n)  1 
PN
i=1 qn, using consumer search data to calculate qn. The results exhibit
some variation in the estimates of the search cost. For example, 29 percent of buyers
of The Da Vinci Code have search cost below 1 = $1:12.
Second, I take into account the strong preference/awareness for some retailers dis-
played in consumerssearch patterns. Firmsunequal probabilities are calculated as-
suming a sampling without replacement rule with perfect recall, using the proportion
of people that visit each rm as the relevant consumer sampling rule (see Appendix
A). I calculate the expected minimum price for each sample size by sampling n prices
using this probability.
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 6 report search cuto¤s using unequal sampling proba-
bilities. The cuto¤s of the search distribution are signicantly reduced in all cases.
On average, 1 decreases by 45 percent, from $2.3 to $1.24. The proportional reduc-
tion is much higher for 1. For example, under equal sampling, the 29th quantile of
the distribution of The Da Vinci Code buyers has a search cost below $1.12. Under
unequal sampling the same quantile has search cost below $0.55. It follows that the
search cost distribution under equal sampling satises the criteria for rst-order sto-
chastic dominance over the distribution with unequal sampling in all cases, except
for the Lovely Bones. Thus, expected search cost is consistently overstimated using
equal sampling.
The results indicate that the benets of search are much smaller once I control for
the asymmetric nature of search. As incentives for search are small, search is small
and reected in the large proportion of people that do not search within the online
book industry. Although using data on consumer search greatly simplies recovery
of the search cost distribution, it has one drawback as stated by Hong and Shum
(2006). This methodology cannot identify search cost for non-searchers, that is, for
those with search cost above 1.
To address some of these limitations, in the next section I t an ordered response
model that exploits search data to recover search cost distributions from consumer
characteristics, and I address the limitations of this methodology with respect to the
identication of non-searchers.
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5.1 Sources of Search Cost Heterogeneity
In this section, I explore the determinants of consumer search cost heterogeneity. One
measure of search cost is the time spent searching for a particular item; however, not
all consumer browsing is costly search. For example, some consumers enjoy shopping
and spend time browsing the selection of books looking for new acquisitions. The
measure of time spent searching comprises both types of consumer browsing. Table
7 presents regression estimates of the total time spent searching for a book based
on consumer characteristics. The total duration of search is presented in equation
(1), and in (2) excluding those visits where consumers complete the transaction. The
same distinction is made in equations (3) and (4), but for the average time spent per
book bought.
There are interesting patterns in Table 7 that indicate some consumers enjoy
shopping. We would expect consumers to spend less time visiting retailers where
they had made transactions in the past if consumersobjective is to minimize time
spent online. However, repeated interactions with the same retailer do not decrease
the duration of the visits. On the contrary, consumers spend 8 to 11 more minutes
per visit to known retailers (equations 1 and 2). Consumers with a larger number
of past purchases spent more time visiting bookstores, which clearly indicates that
demand e¤ects outweigh any possible learning or time-saving strategies for Internet
search. Also, visit duration could derive from consumersreactions to promotional
o¤ers. While consumers spend more time on a transaction that qualies for free
shipping (total book expenses  $25), they spend less time per book, even when I
exclude transaction visits.
An important source of search cost heterogeneity is the relative value of the time
of di¤erent individuals as implied by their socio-demographic characteristics. Aguiar
and Hurst (2005) found that at the time of retirement, individuals reduce food expen-
ditures without an equivalent reduction on quantity or quality of food consumption.
The discrepancy between expenditure and consumption is explained by retirees spend-
ing more time searching for food. Table 7 shows similar evidence of relatively low
opportunity cost for retired people. Those with 60 or more years of age spend 5 to
6 minutes more on search than those with 45 to 50 years of age (omitted category).
Surprisingly, when lengthy transaction visits are excluded, the discrepancy is greater:
60- to 65-year-olds spend 9 to 11 minutes more on search than younger shoppers.
There is an inverse monotonic relationship between education level and search
duration. Those with lower education levels spend more time searching. This could
be explained by the higher relative opportunity cost of more educated people, but
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also because more educated people might be more e¢ cient in their search strate-
gies. Minorities, with the exception of Hispanics, spent more time searching before
a transaction. Income levels exhibit a relationship to search costs that is similar
to education levels, with higher-income individuals devoting less time to search. In
this framework I cannot distinguish if this di¤erence results from di¤erent budget
constraints or higher relative value of time.
While time spent searching is a good approximation of search cost heterogeneity
as shown above, there are also other important elements that inuence the duration
of search. Using information on the number of bookstores searched, I can analyze
search cost heterogeneity directly. Recall that consumers with higher search cost will
optimally visit fewer stores. Table 8 displays ordered probit estimates of the number
of bookstores visited by consumers based on household demographic characteristics
and transaction variables. The dependent variable is the number of bookstores visited
for each transaction (n = 1; : : : ; 4). Equations (1) and (2) pool transactions from the
years 2002 and 2004, and include the household demographic characteristics summa-
rized in Table 4. Equations (3) and (4) include state of residence indicator variables
(this information is only available for 2004). In equation (4), only transactions where
a single book title was purchased are considered.
Although broadband users do not spend more time searching, faster speeds make
it less costly to visit another bookstore. Relatively lower search cost is reected in a
greater number of bookstores visited by broadband users, for those of 30 to 34 years
of age across specications. Asians and people from 55 to 64 exhibit relatively lower
search costs (equations 1 and 2). The price coe¢ cient in equation (4) indicates that
higher expected savings induce a larger sampling by consumers. An interesting case
is the relatively higher search cost of individuals with income greater than $100,000
per year, which is consistent across specications.
6 Conclusions
I use novel data on consumer online browsing and purchasing behavior to structurally
estimate a nonsequential search model. In contrast to models in which consumers have
no information about prices, I assume that consumers are knowledgeable about the
equilibrium price distributions. This assumption is supported by consumer search
patterns in the online book industry.
Search patterns in the online book industry indicate limited consumer search and
a strong preference for particular retailers. In only 25 percent of transactions did con-
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sumers visit more than one bookstore website. Amazons dominance in this industry
is reected in consumer search patterns. I nd that symmetry assumptions as to prices
in online markets can lead to biased estimates of search cost and possibly measures
of price dispersion. Search model estimates that incorporate market asymmetries,
as captured by consumer search behavior, imply empirical market distributions that
support lower search costs in equilibrium.
In addition, I show that search data is helpful to analyze the sources of consumer
search heterogeneity. Estimates of search cost on consumer characteristics show a
strong substitution between time and expenditures in online markets.
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A Estimation of Minimum Prices under Equal and
Unequal Sampling Probabilities
This appendix shows the methodology of unequal probabilities from search data im-
plied by a discrete empirical price distribution. Let the equilibrium price distribution
of the market, denoted by probability mass function
fp (p) = j for p = pj; j = 1; :::; N
where j > 0 for j = 1; ::; N and
PN
j=1 j = 1. Let prices fpigni=1 be a sequence of i.i.d.
random variables rearranged in ascending order of magnitude, p1  p2  :::  pn.
The expected minimum price from a sample of size n is given by
Epn(1) = E [min fp1; :::; png ;n] =
nX
j=1
pjf
n
p(1)
(pj)
where fnp(1) (p) denotes the p.m.f. of the minimum order statistic when a consumer
samples n prices without replacement.
In the case equal probability sampling without replacement, fp(p) =  = 1=N for
p = p1; :::; pN . I estimate the p.m.f of the minimum order statistic by combinatorial
analysis. In the case that n prices are sampled, the minimum price of the sample is
given by
fnp1(x) =
 
N x
n 1
 
N
n
 x = 1; 2; ::; N + 1  n
where x 2 [1; 2; :::; N + 1  n] denotes the reordered support of p 2 [p1; p2; :::; pN+1 n]
(see Evans et al., 2006).
In the case of unequal sampling, there are three cases to consider. First, if only
one price is sampled, n = 1; the p.m.f of the minimum reduces to
f 1p1(x) = fp (p) :
Second, if all the stores are sampled, n = N; the minimum price is observed, hence
fNp1 (p) = 1. Finally, 2 < n < N   2 is a non-trivial case, with no closed form. It is
calculated from combinatorial procedures.
For simplicity, dene 
n as the set of containing the combination of n prices
21
sampled from p1; :::; pn:for the case N = 4 and n = 2 the set

2 = [fp1; p2g ; fp1; p3g ; :::; fp3; p4g] :
Let !n 2 
n be a combination of prices sampled by consumers when searching k
rms. In order to compute the probability of obtaining !n we have to calculate the
probability of all the permutations. For example, the probability a combination !2,
fp1; p2g is given by the sum of the probability of all permutations [p1; p2] and [p2; p1]
fp(p1)
fp(p2)
1  fp(p1) + fp(p2)
fp(p1)
1  fp(p2) = 1
2
1  1 + 2
1
1  2 :
Given a consumer search process 	n;we can calculate the probability that pj is ob-
served when n prices are sampled, denoted by nj=Pr (pj 2 !2 j 	n). For example,
for n = 2 the probability of a consumer observing p1 is
21 =
X
!22
2
j 6=h

j
h
1  j + h
j
1  h

= 1
2
1  1 + 2
1
1  2 +
+1
3
1  3 + 3
1
1  3 +
+1
4
1  4 + 4
1
1  4
and equivalent probabilities for p2; :::; pn: Since in this case p1is the minimum price,
this corresponds to the probability that p1 is the minimum order statistic fnp1(p1) = 
n
1
for every n. For prices other than the minimum, fnp1(p1) is not trivial, e.g. the
probability of p2 being the minimum of a sample n = 2 is equal to the probability
that we observe p2; but not p1:
f 2p1(p2) = 2
3
1  3 + 3
2
1  3 + 2
4
1  4 + 4
2
1  4
The objective is to estimate the probabilities nj from consumer search data. Dene
the probability that consumer i samples pj when optimally sampling n prices as nji
such that
PN
j=1 
n
ji = 1: The share of consumers who visit the store for each sample
size, n, hence the rms probability of being sampled given a consumer search process
	n is
^
n
j =
1
M
MX
i=1
nji:
It follows
PN
j=1 ^
n
j = 1: For consumers who sample one store, n = 1;we know that
22
^
1
j = ^j from the data is the proportion of consumers whose rst visit was to store j
before each transaction. Using ^j I can recover ^
n
j for n = 2; ::; N assuming sampling
without replacement with perfect recall. For example for n = 2
^
2
j =
X
!22
2
j 6=h

^j
^h
1  ^j + ^h
^j
1  ^h

:
Notice that in the case that a consumer randomly sample prices ^
n
j =  = 1=N for
every n and j.
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B Data Sample Construction
This appendix describes in detail the construction of the book dataset from the Com-
Score data. I excluded observations from rms that could not be identied as online
bookstores, such as unidentied domains and auction sites. In total, 18 percent of the
sample transactions were excluded; most of these were from Ebay.com (15 percent of
transactions). Although the excluded transactions represent a large number of obser-
vations, they cannot be considered sales from an online bookstore because they are
auctions of potentially di¤erent books, for example used books, autographed volumes,
or auctioned items. A small number of transactions from international Amazon web-
sites (in the United Kingdom, Canada, and Denmark) were also dropped. To avoid
double counting, browsing activity from Borders.com is excluded. Although initially
Borders operated Borders.com, in April 2001 it signed a commercial agreement giving
Amazon control of customer service, fulllment, and inventory operations. As a result
all visits to Borders.com are redirected to Amazon.com.
I restrict the sample to book transactions and eliminate all non-book transactions
(i.e. a large number of periodicals, and smaller numbers of videos, DVDs, calendars,
CDs, and audio books). The main di¢ culty is in identifying identical books at dif-
ferent sellers given that in some cases product description di¤ers across rms. For
example, rms may add or omit the subtitle, author, series name, publisher, edition,
or year in the book description. I attempted to match the books by name whenever
possible using the information available, mainly by separating book descriptors. How-
ever, to reduce errors and homogenize the remaining book names, I corrected them
by visual inspection in less than 2 percent of the sample. There were some irregular
observations in the data. Observations with negative prices or price or quantity equal
to zero were dropped from the sample. Also, books with a price less than $2 were
dropped from the sample. Under these restrictions, 8 percent of the observations were
excluded.
B.1 Current Population Survey
I use weighted data from the Internet and Computer Use Supplement of the Current
Population Survey from October 2003. I restrict the sample to those who have In-
ternet access at home, are 18 years of age or older, and who claimed to have made
purchases online. The resulting sample contains users with greater income and edu-
cation, without a signicant change in the age distribution. Those claiming Hispanic
ethnicity were categorized as Hispanic regardless of race. Broadband is dened as
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having DSL, cable modem, or xed wireless connection such as MMDS. For compar-
ison purposes, households with 6 members or more (3 percent of the sample) were
considered to have 6 members. Yearly income was estimated by multiplying weekly
earnings by 52.
B.2 Forrester Data
I use the Forrester Consumer Technographics Survey 2003 conducted from December
2002 to February 2003.17 This survey contains a large array of questions about the
online activities of more than 60,000 Internet users and has been used to analyze other
Internet-related issues. I restrict the sample to U.S. individuals who have Internet
access at home, are 18 years of age or older, and who declare they have made a
purchase online in the last 3 months. In this survey, education level is for the head of
household and age is for the oldest member of the household. Broadband is dened as
the user having an ISDN connection, cable modem, DSL, satellite, or xed wireless.
Household size was capped at 6 members.
B.3 Zip Code Data
I estimate the number of bookstores located in a 5-mile radius of each user in the
dataset using the ZIP Code Business Patterns, 2004. This corresponds to the total
number of establishments in the Bookstores category, dened as establishments pri-
marily engaged in retailing new books(NAICS code 451211). I calculate the number
of bookstores located in a ZIP code whose centroid is located within a 5-miles radius
of the users ZIP code centroid. The centroid information was obtained from Zip
Code Tabulation Area for 2000 from the U.S. Census Bureau.
17See Brown and Goolsbee (2002) for a detailed description of dataset and Prince (2004) for an
estimation of the demand of personal computers using the Forrester survey.
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Table 1: Consumer Browsing and Transaction Data Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev.
Boostrap 
Std. Err. Mean Std. Dev.
Boostrap 
Std. Err.
Duration of each website visit (in minutes)
Visits not within 7 days of transaction 8.89 13.03 0.04 7.69 12.36 0.03
Visits within 7 days, excluding transactions 12.21 15.55 0.16 10.72 14.84 0.10
Visits within 7 days, excluding transactions 19.04 18.26 0.16 15.74 17.37 0.12
Transactions only 27.90 17.69 0.18 25.93 17.68 0.19
Total duration, excluding transaction visits 32.47 49.80 0.83 38.41 78.33 1.14
Total duration, including transaction visits 43.77 43.72 0.47 47.68 65.99 0.69
Number of firms searched 1.27 0.54 0.01 1.30 0.56 0.01
Number of books per transaction 2.38 2.10 0.02 2.20 1.95 0.02
Transaction expenditures (books only) 36.70 40.67 0.54 32.21 35.68 0.35
Number of books purchased 17,956 17,631
Number of transaction sessions 7,559 8,002
Number of visits within 7 days 18,349 25,513
Number of visits not within 7 days 94,012 189,200
2002
Notes: This table presents descriptive measures of user browsing of online bookstores calculated from
ComScore data for the period July–September 2002 and for the year 2004. The number of stores visited
and the duration in minutes of user visits to each bookstore are summarized for the 7-day cutoff period
prior to each book purchase.
2004
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Table 2: Browsing by Firm
All Amazon Barnes & Book Other
bookstores Noble clubs bookstores
First firm searched (%)
Amazon 65.4 91.1 23.6 19.1 28.6
Barnes & Noble 16.9 3.5 67.8 2.2 5.5
Book clubs 10.8 1.6 2.8 74.2 3.2
Other bookstores 6.9 3.8 5.8 4.5 62.7
100 100 100 100 100
Firm searched (%)
Amazon 73.6 -- 31.3 24.0 37.6
Barnes & Noble 27.5 8.6 -- 5.1 13.7
Book clubs 15.3 3.0 4.5 -- 5.6
Other bookstores 13.1 8.5 11.1 8.1 --
Any other bookstore -- 17.3 39.0 30.6 45.7
Number of firms searched 1.29 1.20 1.47 1.37 1.57
(0.56) (0.47) (0.64) (0.62) (0.70)
Number of books 35,587 22,226 7,441 4,356 1,564
Notes: This table presents search patterns related to book transactions. All searches
are linked to the next transaction and are limited to a maximum of 7 days prior to
each book purchase. The mean and standard deviation are presented for the number
of firms searched. Book clubs include the following sites (.com): Christianbook,
Doubledaybookclub, Eharlequin, Literaryguild, and Mysteryguild. Other bookstores
include (.com): 1bookstreet, Allbooks4less, Alldirect, Booksamillion, Ecampus,
Powells, Varsitybooks, and Walmart.
Book purchased from
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Table 3: Search and Transaction Behavior by Length of Search Period
All Amazon Barnes & Book Other
bookstores Noble clubs bookstores
Book purchased from
One firm visited
7 days 0.76 0.82 0.61 0.71 0.53
5 days 0.79 0.85 0.65 0.76 0.57
3 days 0.82 0.87 0.70 0.81 0.61
1 day 0.86 0.90 0.76 0.88 0.66
Transaction day 0.90 0.93 0.83 0.93 0.74
Two or more firms visited
P h d f th l t fi i it durc ase  rom e as  rm v s e
7 days 0.65 0.50 0.80 0.82 0.77
5 days 0.63 0.48 0.77 0.77 0.74
3 d 0 61 0 46 0 75 0 72 0 73 ays . . . . .
1 day 0.60 0.46 0.74 0.69 0.73
Transaction day 0.61 0.47 0.75 0.70 0.74
Purchased from a previously visited firm
7 days 0.35 0.50 0.20 0.18 0.23
5 days 0.37 0.52 0.23 0.23 0.26
3 days 0.39 0.54 0.25 0.28 0.27
1 day 0.40 0.54 0.26 0.31 0.27
Transaction day 0.39 0.53 0.25 0.30 0.26
Number of transaction sessions 15,561 10,197 3,042 1,653 669
Notes: This table presents search patterns related to book transactions. All transaction session
data fall into the category ‘‘one firm visited” or ‘‘two or more firms visited ” All searches are.
linked to the next transaction and are limited to a maximum of 7, 5, 3, or 1 days prior to each
book purchase, or to the same day of the transaction. The number in the first panel reflects the
proportion of transaction sessions where consumers visited one firm for each of the lengthts of
search periods considered. The subgroup ‘‘two or more firms visited” is further divided according
to consumers’ transaction strategy. For those who searched more than one firm, the numbers
represent the proportion of transactions where consumers bought from the last firm they visited or
th ti th t ll d i b b i f i l i it d fie propor on a  reca e  a pr ce y uy ng rom a prev ous y v s e  rm.
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Table 4: Demographic Characteristics of Internet Users
ComScore ComScore ComScore Forrester Population
Variable Book Sample 2002 2004 2003 CPS 2003
Number of users 9,446 38,193 24,834 28,716 10,504,092
Broadband connection 0.42 0.44 0.34 0.28 0.47
(0.49) (0.50) (0.47) (0.45) (0.50)
Household size 2.94 3.05 2.95 2.69 3.02
(1.36) (1.36) (1.34) (1.25) (1.29)
Children present in household 0.41 0.46 0.37 0.36 0.43
(0.49) (0.50) (0.48) (0.48) (0.49)
Age distribution  (%)
18–20 1.9 2.7 0.7 0.2 3.3
21–24 4.2 5.3 3.6 1.2 7.7
25–29 6.4 6.9 6.4 4.9 11.3
30–34 9.5 9.8 10.7 8.2 13.9
35–39 9.0 8.6 11.1 11.7 13.9
40–44 11.9 10.7 14.8 14.4 14.4
45–49 16.0 17.7 15.2 13.3 13.7
50–54 15.9 16.2 13.4 14.1 10.5
55–59 9.1 8.0 8.9 12.2 7.1
60–64 7.1 6.6 6.2 8.0 3.1
65 and over 9.0 7.6 8.9 11.7 1.1
Household income distribution (%)
Less than $15,000 4.7 5.1 5.7 3.9 12.8
$15,000 – $24,999 8.5 9.9 8.9 5.7 15.9
$25,000 – $34,999 13.7 14.8 15.7 7.8 15.8
$35,000 – $49,999 19.8 20.1 20.8 12.8 22.6
$50,000 – $74,999 26.3 26.1 25.3 18.3 18.8
$75,000 – $99,999 13.2 12.1 12.2 26.7 8.0
More than $100,000 13.9 12.1 11.3 24.9 6.2
Education distribution (%)
Number of observations 6,573 27,148 16,108 28,716 10,504,092
Less than high school 1.29 1.5 2.7 1.7 1.8
High school diploma or GED 13.91 16.0 22.0 11.6 17.8
Some college but no degree 30.15 36.6 31.6 18.5 20.2
Associate degree 10.86 10.5 12.3 7.0 10.7
Bachelor’s degree 26.18 22.1 20.6 32.0 32.6
Graduate degree 17.60 13.4 10.9 29.3 16.9
Race (%)
White 81.5 81.3 74.7 88.3 81.3
Black 4.3 4.7 7.3 4.4 5.7
Hispanic 8.8 7.9 13.1 4.6 5.8
Asian 3.1 3.3 2.6 2.2 5.9
Other 2.4 2.8 2.3 0.5 1.2
Region of residence (%)
Northeast 21.5 19.3 19.2 21.7 21.9
Midwest 22.0 24.4 22.6 24.4 23.4
South 32.7 34.3 35.7 32.5 31.0
West 23.8 22.0 22.6 21.5 23.7
Sources: ComScore Web-Behavior Panel dataset (June 2002–December 2002); 2003 Forrester
Technographics Consumer Survey; and the Internet and Computer Use Supplement, CPS October 2003.
Notes: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. The sample is restricted to users located in the
United States who access the Internet at home. CPS data is weighted. Those claiming Hispanic ethnicity
were categorized as Hispanic regardless of race. For ComScore and Forrester data, education level is for
the head of household, not necessarily the oldest member; for CPS education level is the respondent’s.
For ComScore and Forrester, age refers to the oldest member of household; for CPS it is the age of the
respondent. For expositional simplicity, households with 6 members or more (3 percent of the sample)
were considered to have 6 members.
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Selected Books
Product name Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max q 1 q 2 q 3
Best sellers 2004
The Da Vinci Code 52 14.3 1.1 12.7 15.0 0.712 0.250 0.038
Trace 21 16.2 2.5 13.9 18.9 0.524 0.429 0.048
R Is for Ricochet 21 16.9 4.7 11.7 20.9 0.667 0.286 0.048
3rd Degree 18 16.8 2.1 14.7 18.9 0.833 0.111 0.056
Key of Valor 10 7.5 2.6 4.9 11.0 0.600 0.300 0.100
State of Fear 9 16.0 0.8 15.2 16.8 0.556 0.333 0.111
Best sellers 2002
From a Buick 8 37 17.5 2.2 15.1 19.6 0.730 0.243 0.027
Four Blind Mice 35 17.1 2.3 15.1 19.2 0.800 0.171 0.029
Nights in Rodanthe 17 13.9 1.1 12.9 15.1 0.824 0.059 0.118
The Lovely Bones 14 14.0 4.8 10.0 21.0 0.643 0.214 0.143
Harry Potter and the Goblet of Fire 14 10.9 4.7 6.0 16.0 0.786 0.143 0.071
Visions of Sugar Plums 14 13.2 0.6 12.6 13.8 0.857 0.000 0.143
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for the books with the largest online sales in the sample
each year. N represents the maximum number of bookstores with price data. q n represents the
proportion of consumers that visited n=1,…,N  bookstores.
Prices ($) Consumers by Sample Size (%)
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Table 6: Empirical Non-Sequential Search Cost CDF for Selected Books
Unequal Sampling
Product name ∆ 1 ∆ 2 ∆ 1 ∆ 2 G(∆ 1 ) G(∆ 2 )
Best sellers 2004
The Da Vinci Code 1.124 0.512 0.557 0.019 0.288 0.038
Trace 1.980 0.988 1.012 0.108 0.476 0.048
R Is for Ricochet 4.129 2.061 2.102 0.127 0.333 0.048
3rd Degree 1.714 0.855 0.875 0.078 0.167 0.056
Key of Valor 1.170 0.587 0.316 0.144 0.400 0.100
State of Fear 0.697 0.348 0.520 0.100 0.444 0.111
Best sellers 2002
From a Buick 8 3.261 0.753 1.242 0.083 0.270 0.027
Four Blind Mice 3.284 0.650 1.224 0.034 0.200 0.029
Nights in Rodanthe 0.884 0.441 0.779 0.194 0.176 0.118
The Lovely Bones 5.914 0.679 4.557 1.016 0.357 0.143
Harry Potter and the Goblet of Fire 2.858 1.432 1.595 1.091 0.214 0.071
Visions of Sugar Plums 0.538 0.270 0.111 0.020 0.143 0.143
Equal Sampling
Notes: For each of the products listed, the number of firms searched is N=3 . I can only
report the quantile estimates of the search cost distribution for n=1,2 defined by
G(∆ 1 )=1-q 1 , G(∆ 2 )=1-q 1 -q 2 , G(∆ 3 )=0 . The search cutoffs are the expected gain of
additional search ∆ n . Each expected price was measured by averaging over 100,000
iterations. The minimum of N prices was obtained by sampling without replacement
from the empirical price distribution.
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Table 7: Regression of Search Duration on Household Characterisitcs
Variable Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Number of unique firms visited 29.447 (0.779)*** 18.217 (1.121)*** 18.551 (0.619)*** 12.007 (0.883)***
Number of books bought 3.215 (0.221)*** 1.896 (0.375)***
First transaction indicator 7.149 (1.647)*** 5.041 (2.641)* 5.301 (1.307)*** 3.777 (2.080)*
Same bookstore as previous transaction 7.932 (1.688)*** 11.147 (2.704)*** 6.508 (1.340)*** 9.083 (2.130)***
Free shipping (sales ≥ $25) 6.513 (0.937)*** 3.287 (1.610)** -6.722 (0.700)*** -6.882 (1.198)***
Cumulative book transactions 0.399 (0.037)*** 0.467 (0.053)*** 0.309 (0.030)*** 0.363 (0.042)***
Household size 1.275 (0.431)*** 1.570 (0.721)** 0.636 (0.343)* 0.643 (0.568)
Broadband connection -0.683 (0.867) 0.260 (1.474) -0.613 (0.689) -0.008 (1.162)
Children present in household -0.734 (1.170) -1.287 (1.978) -0.472 (0.929) -0.496 (1.559)
Age
18–20 -5.211 (3.651) -4.799 (6.280) -1.460 (2.899) -2.034 (4.949)
21–24 -1.247 (2.530) -0.903 (4.389) -0.964 (2.009) -1.884 (3.458)
25–29 -1.343 (2.072) -0.101 (3.528) -0.380 (1.645) -0.095 (2.780)
30–34 1.449 (1.780) 3.714 (2.996) 1.039 (1.414) 2.606 (2.361)
35–39 1.220 (1.791) 1.853 (3.045) -0.321 (1.422) -0.241 (2.399)
40–44 -1.036 (1.629) 0.142 (2.774) -1.085 (1.293) -0.595 (2.186)
50–54 -1.045 (1.504) -1.213 (2.557) -0.803 (1.194) -0.290 (2.015)
55–59 0.333 (1.720) 1.200 (2.931) 0.480 (1.366) 0.987 (2.310)
60–64 4.989 (1.870)*** 11.162 (3.216)*** 1.181 (1.484) 4.009 (2.533)
65 and over 5.588 (1.720)*** 8.500 (2.932)*** 3.610 (1.366)*** 5.866 (2.310)**
Household income
Less than $15,000 1.320 (2.182) -1.820 (3.678) 1.719 (1.733) -0.260 (2.899)
$15,000 – $24,999 6.162 (1.756)*** 7.145 (2.977)** 3.511 (1.394)** 3.053 (2.346)
$25,000 – $34,999 4.310 (1.405)*** 3.725 (2.401) 2.490 (1.115)** 1.413 (1.892)
$35,000 – $49,999 2.392 (1.262)* 3.672 (2.163)* 1.583 (1.002) 2.527 (1.704)
$75,000 – $99,999 2.694 (1.417)* 4.623 (2.410)* 1.631 (1.125) 2.786 (1.899)
More than $100,000 -4.174 (1.399)*** -3.116 (2.415) -3.005 (1.111)*** -2.997 (1.903)
Education
Less than high school 15.141 (5.061)*** 13.440 (8.070)* 11.528 (4.019)*** 12.338 (6.360)*
High school diploma or GED 5.935 (1.682)*** 7.577 (2.888)*** 2.295 (1.335)* 2.603 (2.276)
Some college but no degree 3.225 (1.367)** 3.884 (2.360)* 0.825 (1.086) 0.867 (1.860)
Associate degree 1.595 (1.838) 2.906 (3.148) 1.542 (1.460) 1.692 (2.479)
Graduate degree -1.107 (1.525) -0.941 (2.636) -0.510 (1.211) 0.010 (2.077)
Race
Black 7.540 (2.203)*** 7.552 (3.771)** 6.058 (1.750)*** 5.381 (2.972)*
Hispanic -0.747 (1.527) -2.808 (2.588) -0.641 (1.212) -2.434 (2.039)
Asian 13.671 (2.580)*** 18.748 (4.241)*** 9.681 (2.048)*** 11.805 (3.341)***
Other 6.450 (2.841)** 10.327 (4.838)** 6.327 (2.256)*** 9.336 (3.813)**
Region of residence
Northeast 1.380 (1.181) 0.997 (1.991) 1.846 (0.938)** 1.770 (1.569)
Midwest 1.680 (1.172) 3.310 (2.007)* 1.116 (0.931) 2.702 (1.582)*
West 1.302 (1.150) 1.099 (1.986) 0.785 (0.913) 0.997 (1.565)
Constant -22.941 (2.826)*** -23.716 (4.797)*** -4.624 (2.229)** -7.391 (3.750)**
Years
Transaction visits
Multiple books
R-squared
Number of individuals
Notes: This table presents regression estimates of the duration of search on consumer characteristics. The dependent
variable is the duration in minutes of user visits to each bookstore for the 7-day cutoff period prior to each book purchase.
The number of firms visited is the unique number of bookstores browsed during this period, 1 to 4 firms. “First transaction”
indicates the first observation in the dataset for the user. “Cumulative book transactions” are the number of book purchases
prior to the current one. “Number of nearby bookstores” corresponds to the total number of bricks and mortar bookstores
located in a ZIP code within a 5-mile radius of the user’s ZIP code address obtained from ZIP Business Patterns, 2004. The
estimation includes non-reported state of residency indicator variables. Standard errors are robust clustered by user. *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
0.13 0.06 0.08 0.05
15561 8206 15561 8206
Yes Yes Avg. duration/book Avg. duration/book
2002, 2004 2002, 2004 2002, 2004 2002, 2004
Yes No Yes No
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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Table 8: Ordered Probit Estimates of Sample Size on Household Characterisitcs
Variable Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
First transaction indicator -0.612 (0.040)*** -0.541 (0.051)*** -0.461 (0.075)***
Same bookstore as previous transaction -0.705 (0.042)*** -0.632 (0.054)*** -0.510 (0.082)***
Free shipping (sales ≥ $25) 0.012 (0.027) 0.048 (0.037) -0.008 (0.053)
Multiple books -0.012 (0.026) 0.063 (0.034)*
Price 0.003 (0.001)**
Number of nearby bookstores -0.047 (0.047) -0.032 (0.058)
Cumulative book transactions 0.009 (0.002)*** 0.008 (0.002)*** 0.006 (0.002)*** 0.004 (0.002)***
Household size 0.066 (0.018)*** 0.064 (0.017)*** 0.086 (0.024)*** 0.056 (0.031)*
Broadband connection 0.111 (0.029)*** 0.108 (0.028)*** 0.154 (0.041)*** 0.135 (0.053)**
Children present in household -0.030 (0.046) -0.030 (0.044) -0.074 (0.062) 0.063 (0.079)
Age
18–20 0.018 (0.104) 0.014 (0.102) 0.015 (0.300) -0.039 (0.534)
21–24 0.028 (0.074) 0.010 (0.071) -0.061 (0.103) -0.029 (0.142)
25–29 0.016 (0.063) 0.010 (0.061) 0.012 (0.089) 0.141 (0.112)
30–34 0.127 (0.058)** 0.117 (0.055)** 0.171 (0.077)** 0.231 (0.098)**
35–39 0.127 (0.059)** 0.112 (0.057)* 0.148 (0.076)* 0.134 (0.098)
40–44 0.094 (0.053)* 0.087 (0.052)* 0.051 (0.069) 0.007 (0.088)
50–54 0.053 (0.049) 0.042 (0.048) 0.021 (0.072) 0.094 (0.092)
55–59 0.147 (0.059)** 0.135 (0.057)** 0.117 (0.084) 0.127 (0.106)
60–64 0.144 (0.081)* 0.128 (0.076)* 0.105 (0.119) 0.167 (0.158)
65 and over -0.018 (0.061) -0.023 (0.057) -0.079 (0.074) -0.045 (0.099)
Household income
Less than $15,000 0.004 (0.065) 0.007 (0.063) -0.048 (0.085) -0.107 (0.115)
$15,000 – $24,999 0.086 (0.053) 0.085 (0.052) 0.061 (0.072) 0.051 (0.091)
$25,000 – $34,999 0.017 (0.050) 0.025 (0.048) 0.044 (0.064) 0.138 (0.080)*
$35,000 – $49,999 0.062 (0.045) 0.052 (0.043) 0.058 (0.059) 0.118 (0.075)
$75,000 – $99,999 0.017 (0.048) 0.027 (0.047) -0.034 (0.064) -0.011 (0.080)
More than $100,000 -0.115 (0.048)** -0.100 (0.047)** -0.109 (0.067) -0.170 (0.087)**
Education
Less than high school 0.065 (0.149) 0.082 (0.143) 0.098 (0.191) 0.390 (0.245)
High school diploma or GED 0.055 (0.066) 0.054 (0.063) 0.125 (0.082) 0.127 (0.103)
Some college but no degree 0.049 (0.044) 0.059 (0.042) 0.045 (0.060) 0.014 (0.079)
Associate degree -0.035 (0.064) -0.007 (0.063) -0.089 (0.088) -0.092 (0.112)
Graduate degree -0.023 (0.053) -0.018 (0.051) 0.037 (0.074) 0.107 (0.094)
Race
Black 0.092 (0.064) 0.093 (0.063) 0.077 (0.089) -0.011 (0.116)
Hispanic -0.071 (0.053) -0.051 (0.050) -0.067 (0.065) -0.013 (0.081)
Asian 0.174 (0.090)* 0.171 (0.084)** 0.208 (0.127) -0.025 (0.141)
Other 0.075 (0.092) 0.070 (0.089) -0.011 (0.139) -0.023 (0.146)
Region of residence
Northeast 0.045 (0.038) 0.042 (0.037)
Midwest 0.017 (0.042) 0.019 (0.040)
West -0.133 (0.040)*** -0.129 (0.038)***
Years
State dummies
Region dummies
Multiple books
Pseudo R2
Number of individuals
Number of observations
(1)
2002, 2004
No
Yes No
Yes
8985
15561
0.0149
Yes
15561
0.0315
8985
NoYes
0.0404
25284157
37317962
0.0402
Yes
(3)
2004
Yes
NoYes
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of bookstores visited for each transaction (n=1,...,4 ). All searches are
linked to the next transaction and occur no more than 7 days prior to each book purchase. “First transaction”
indicates the first observation in the dataset for the user. “Cumulative book transactions” are the number of book
purchases prior to the current one. “Number of nearby bookstores” corresponds to the total number of bricks and
mortar bookstores located in a ZIP code within a 5-mile radius of the user’s ZIP code address obtained from ZIP
Business Patterns, 2004. The estimation includes non-reported state of residency indicator variables. Standard errors
are robust clustered by user. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
(2) (4)
2002, 2004 2004
No
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Table 9: Geographic Distribution by State of Internet Users
ComScore Population ComScore Population
State 2004 CPS 2003 State 2004 CPS 2003
Alabama 1.1 0.9 Montana 0.4 0.3
Alaska 0.3 0.3 Nebraska 0.6 0.8
Arizona 1.6 1.9 Nevada 0.9 0.8
Arkansas 0.9 0.6 New Hampshire 0.6 0.7
California 11.5 11.9 New Jersey 3.2 3.6
Colorado 2.0 2.1 New Mexico 0.9 0.4
Connecticut 1.2 1.7 New York 7.6 7.0
Delaware 0.4 0.3 North Carolina 3.0 2.5
District Of Columbia 0.3 0.4 North Dakota 0.2 0.3
Florida 6.2 5.1 Ohio 4.1 4.0
Georgia 2.7 2.9 Oklahoma 1.3 0.8
Hawaii 0.3 0.4 Oregon 2.0 1.7
Idaho 0.5 0.6 Pennsylvania 5.4 4.6
Illinois 3.7 3.9 Rhode Island 0.3 0.5
Indiana 1.7 1.5 South Carolina 1.4 1.1
Iowa 1.2 1.1 South Dakota 0.2 0.3
Kansas 0.9 1.0 Tennessee 2.0 1.5
Kentucky 1.1 1.6 Texas 5.7 5.9
Louisiana 1.2 0.9 Utah 0.8 0.9
Maine 0.7 0.4 Vermont 0.3 0.3
Maryland 1.7 2.4 Virginia 3.0 3.1
Massachusetts 2.1 3.1 Washington 2.3 2.3
Michigan 3.2 3.6 West Virginia 0.6 0.5
Minnesota 1.8 2.3 Wisconsin 1.8 2.5
Mississippi 0.7 0.7 Wyoming 0.3 0.2
Missouri 1.9 2.2
Number of observations 4157 10,504,092  
Sources: ComScore Web-Behavior Panel dataset (June 2002–December 2002), 2003 Forrester
Technographic Consumer Survey and the Internet and Computer Use Supplement, CPS
October 2003.
Notes: The sample is restricted to users located in the United States who access the Internet at
home. CPS data is weighted.
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